War on Tehran.. ((The Postponed Decision))

Between tactical postponement and the likelihood of sudden escalation, Washington and Tel Aviv face intertwined calculations, where military considerations overlap with political and electoral interests.

Behind the scenes, conflicting assessments from Washington and Tel Aviv reveal a state of uncertainty regarding the timing of any potential attack on Iran and its objectives.

Media reports quoted a senior Israeli source as saying that the US stance is constantly changing, as Washington oscillates between readiness to attack and affirming that the strike will not occur before the midterm elections, making planning for the next phase extremely difficult.

According to what was published by the Atlantic magazine and the Axios website, the US military instructions did not include a specific date for the implementation of the strikes, but they called on the US Central Command to complete the necessary preparations.

US and Israeli reports indicate that the potential plans may include an intensive 3-day air and missile campaign targeting ballistic missile facilities, drones, energy infrastructure, and nuclear facilities.

These preparations come at a time when any new military confrontation is directly linked to US electoral calculations, as the war could become a political burden on the Republicans, especially if it leads to rising oil and fuel prices and increased living costs.

According to a survey conducted by CNN in cooperation with the SSRS Foundation, more than 70% of voters in Iowa and Ohio said that Trump's policies contributed to increasing living costs.

A study by the Pew Research Center also showed that 74% of Americans are concerned about fuel and energy prices, compared to 43% before the war, according to the figures in the reports.

These indicators put the White House before two risky options; launching an attack before the elections may lead to a new rise in oil prices and strengthen the criticism directed at the administration for engaging in a costly war, while refraining from using force may be interpreted as a retreat in front of Tehran and give it room to strengthen its negotiating position.

In contrast, the Iranian leadership, according to an analysis by Raz Zimet, Director of the Iran and Shiite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel, is based on the assessment that the cost of continuing escalation may be less than the cost of retreat under pressure.

According to this assessment, Tehran adopts an approach based on continuing the confrontation and raising its cost for its opponents, based on the belief that the United States does not want to be dragged into a long-term war.

In this context, the Iranian negotiating position appears more rigid, with linking the Hormuz Strait file to any comprehensive agreement, and not being satisfied with demands to lift the naval blockade in exchange for reopening the Strait.

The data in the reports indicate that Tehran demands the implementation of the US commitments stipulated in the memorandum of understanding signed in June 2026, including the release of frozen funds and lifting sanctions, as a prerequisite for opening the Strait.

Iran also seeks to expand the scope of understandings to include a ceasefire on other regional fronts, particularly in Lebanon and Gaza, in an attempt to link regional de-escalation with its security and strategic interests and enhance its deterrence capability in the face of US and Israeli pressure.

In a development reflecting the extent of the disparity within the US-Israeli camp, Israeli writer Ben Caspit revealed in Maariv newspaper that Washington asked Israel to carry out a solo attack on Iran, instead of US forces undertaking the operation or launching it jointly.

According to Caspit, the US administration wanted Israel to bear the political and security risks of the attack, instead of Trump bearing them before the midterm elections.

According to journalist Barak Ravid, as quoted by Caspit, Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir opposed this approach, warning that a solo Israeli attack could lead to the postponement of elections in Israel.

In light of these concerns, Washington has retreated from its demand for now, reflecting the sensitivity of the timing of the confrontation for both parties and the fact that the disagreements are not limited to the nature of the military operation and its objectives.

The position of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on these developments remains unclear. Caspit points out that Netanyahu's agenda last week was heavily security-focused, interspersed with sensitive contacts and visits, without the nature of the decisions being fully clarified or the extent of their connection to plans to resume the war.

In light of these data, American and Israeli analysts believe that the likelihood of resuming the confrontation may increase after the midterm elections, especially if political efforts fail to address the existing differences.

There are also concerns in Israel that a change in the balance of power within the US Congress may impose greater restrictions on the ability of the next administration to continue military operations, especially if the Republicans lose control of one of the congressional chambers.

However, postponing the attack does not necessarily mean reducing the likelihood of war, but it may be part of broader calculations related to the timing of using force, its cost, and the expected results. According to Zimet's assessment, the more pressure fails to achieve its goals, the more likely it is that Washington will resort to force again, while Tehran may find in continuing escalation a way to get out of the dilemma and improve its negotiating conditions.

Questions remain about the ability of a new military round to achieve the objectives that were not achieved in previous confrontations, whether related to restricting the Iranian nuclear program and preventing it from producing a nuclear weapon, or weakening Iran's military capabilities and reducing its regional influence.

The goal of destabilizing the Iranian regime also remains questionable, given the risks that may arise from expanding the war and the likelihood of its extension to other fronts.

In the absence of a clear horizon for a political settlement, the region appears closer to an armed truce than to a stable peace, as Trump seeks to avoid economic and electoral repercussions that may result from rising oil prices before November 3rd, while Iran tries to avoid a new blow that may target its vital facilities and military capabilities, while preserving the cards of strength it possesses.

Between Washington's electoral calculations, Tel Aviv's military preparations, and Tehran's adherence to its conditions, the two parties are preparing for the possibility of a new round of confrontation, without implying that the decision to resume the war has been made. The post-election period may be a more suitable window for military action, if the US administration believes that the cost of waiting has become higher than the cost of the attack, but any sudden escalation may dissipate these calculations and impose a different timing.

Therefore, the question is not only about when the war will resume, before or after the elections, but also about the extent to which any new military operation can change the strategic equation, or whether it will open another chapter of an open confrontation whose end is difficult to predict.