Reports indicate that the meeting addressed options for military escalation, in light of continued field preparations and varying estimates within the US administration regarding the timing of the attack. However, preparing for war does not mean a decision has been made to execute it, especially since Washington realizes that any new confrontation could expand regionally, imposing military, economic, and political burdens whose trajectories are difficult to control.
For US President Donald Trump, the confrontation is linked to a declared goal of preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon, while maintaining the ability to determine the timing and limits of escalation. Washington wants to weaken Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities, but it is simultaneously calculating the repercussions of war on US forces, energy markets, and international navigation, as well as its impact on the US elections. Reports have confirmed that Trump has not made a final decision regarding the resumption of attacks, and that directing Israel to prepare does not constitute a US pledge to carry out a military operation.
As for Benjamin Netanyahu, he is dealing with the Iranian file in a highly sensitive domestic political context, as any military achievement could enhance his image as a leader capable of confronting strategic threats. Trump's announcement of his support for Netanyahu's re-election reflects the depth of the partnership between the two men and its connection to confronting Tehran, but it does not provide conclusive evidence that Washington will wage a new war to serve Israeli electoral calculations.
Here, the issue of "black ops" emerges, meaning Israel's readiness to carry out operations that achieve strategic goals intersecting with US interests, while relying on military and political support from Washington. Reports have discussed the possibility of providing operational facilities, including refueling aircraft and coordination regarding overflights of third countries. However, Israel is also acting according to its own calculations, while the United States seeks to retain the decision to escalate and avoid being dragged into an open war whose results do not align with its priorities.
The possibilities of a strike before the Israeli elections remain linked to the emergence of a security development that Tel Aviv considers an imminent threat, and the extent of Washington's readiness to provide the necessary support. Netanyahu may see a military operation as an opportunity to improve his electoral position, but a potential Iranian response, and the accompanying losses, economic turmoil, and expansion of confrontation fronts—in addition to Iran's threat to cut internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz—could turn the supposed military achievement into a political and security burden.
Conversely, postponing the attack until after the elections gives Washington more space to evaluate options, continue pressure on Tehran, and use the military threat as a bargaining chip. The possibility of continued preparations and deterrence without a wide-scale war also remains, especially if the US administration sees that the cost of escalation outweighs the expected gains.
For its part, Iran has the relative ability to influence the course of the confrontation through the nature of its response, whether through missiles and drones, through its affiliated militias deployed in some countries in the region, by targeting US and Israeli interests, or by threatening navigation and energy markets. Therefore, the decision to start a war is inseparable from Washington and Tel Aviv's assessment of what could happen the day after the strike.
Data—as of the time of writing this article—indicates that consultations and military preparations are continuing, without confirmation of a final decision to resume the war. The difference will remain decisive between raising readiness and approving execution, and between Netanyahu's desire to achieve a political gain and Trump's ability to bear the consequences of escalation before the US elections.
Accordingly, Israel's execution of "black ops" before or after the elections will remain a possibility conditioned by field developments and the US position, while postponement gives Washington greater ability to control the timing. In both cases, the nature of the US decision and Iran's readiness to respond will determine the limits of the upcoming confrontation, in a region where the cost of war remains linked to the repercussions it may trigger, as much as it is linked to the military goals that each party seeks to achieve.
