The "Gaza Plan" between the American decision and Israeli anxiety

On October 8, 2026, the Institute published a document titled "Traffic Light System for Implementing the Peace Council Plan for the Gaza Strip – A Proposed Policy for Israel," prepared by the Institute's head and former Chief of Military Intelligence, Tamir Hayman. The document comes in light of political and security arrangements for the post-war phase in Gaza.

The importance of the document lies in its admission that "Israeli policy is in reality the policy of the United States, although Israel is still able to influence it," which raises questions about the extent to which Israel retains its sovereign decision-making regarding the future of the Strip. The document addresses what it calls American "constructive ambiguity," based on not finalizing many details in agreements with Iran, Hamas, and Lebanon, which gives Washington a wide margin for maneuver and flexibility in implementation. However, this approach carries risks, most notably the difficulty of defining the status quo and the possibility of parties interpreting agreements to serve their own interests, which could lead to misunderstandings and military escalation.

The document argues that Israel has practically agreed to a form of "outsourcing to the Americans" in managing national security policy, as it participates in some operations and maintains direct channels with the US President, yet the decisions that shape the future of its relations in the region are largely made in Washington. The document confirms that the 20-point plan was not, in its essence, the imposition of an American idea on Israel, but rather an implementation of an Israeli plan for post-war Gaza. The strategic plan was proposed on the eve of the start of the ground maneuver in October 2023, and was based on transitioning to "Phase Three" after dismantling Hamas battalions and destroying its military infrastructure, then gradually transferring civil control to a technocratic government that is not affiliated with Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.

However, the Israeli government did not adopt a political framework parallel to military action during the first two years of the war, before the arrangements of the 20-point plan were later imposed upon it.

The plan includes the establishment of an "International Peace Council for Gaza" to oversee the technocratic administration, which is the National Committee for the Management of Gaza, supported by an international security force that will maintain security and oversee the disarmament of the Strip.

The document highlights the nineteenth clause of the plan as the most sensitive, because it includes a political path that could lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, and considers it a fundamental condition for expanding the "Abraham Accords."

According to the Israeli reading presented by the document, the government agreed to this framework based on the assumption that Hamas would not fulfill its commitments, and that the implementation of the plan would falter after the release of the hostages, allowing for the resumption of the war with American support.

But developments have surpassed this calculation. With the start of Operation "Lion's Roar" against Iran, Hamas backed away from its commitment to hand over heavy weapons, tunnels, and weapons production sites, while the Israeli army continued to control additional parts of the Strip, increasing the area under its control from 53% to about 65%. In contrast, Hamas focused on strengthening its civil and security control within the Strip.

The document addresses the current phase through the 15-point plan, which aims to introduce the technocratic government into Gaza and return the process to the agreed-upon path.

Israel is not a direct party to it, except for its agreement to the entry of a foreign military force into its territory.

The plan, from the Israeli point of view, poses several problems, most notably the mechanism for verifying the disarmament of Hamas, with the participation of Qatar and Turkey, and the handover of weapons to a Palestinian security authority whose nature and powers have not been defined, in addition to the lack of a clear definition of "defensive" and "offensive" weapons.

The identity of the Palestinian force that will take charge of internal security has also not been settled.

The document proposes transforming the existing field division in Gaza into a system for reconstruction and disarmament, through three zones: a red zone that constitutes about 38% of the Strip's area, inhabited by about 1.8 million people, and is under Hamas control; a green zone that constitutes about 53% and is under the Israeli army; and an orange zone that constitutes about 12%, which are the areas the Israeli army controlled outside the yellow line since the ceasefire.

The idea is based on linking reconstruction to disarmament, according to the principle of "demobilization in exchange for reconstruction."

In the red zone, the technocratic administration takes over civil governance, while Hamas gradually hands over its weapons, and the Palestinian police, who have undergone training and security vetting, return.

As for the orange zone, it will witness a gradual Israeli withdrawal in conjunction with the deployment of international security forces and the start of reconstruction.

In the green zone, Israeli forces remain until disarmament is verified, with withdrawal to take place gradually in exchange for "documented disarmament."

The document recommends that the verification process be international, with the participation of the United States, Qatar, Turkey, and other countries, and that the committee have the authority to conduct surprise inspections, access suspicious sites, perform technical checks, and utilize intelligence information.

It also calls on Israel to maintain cooperation with the Trump administration and avoid public confrontation with it, and to establish a specialized working channel between the Israeli National Security Council and the counterparts in the "Peace Council" to present Israeli reservations through diplomatic channels, in addition to accelerating the establishment of the alternative civil government and Palestinian security forces.

The document identifies five main challenges: first, the possibility of Hamas refusing to abandon its identity as an armed resistance movement; second, the risks of Israeli withdrawal and the fears it may raise within Israel; third, the restriction of the army's freedom of action as a result of the presence of an international force; fourth, the possibility of Hamas continuing to rule from behind the scenes through elements joining security agencies; and fifth, the lack of participation by European countries if there is no clear political path toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the face of this, the document suggests that Israel show commitment to the political path contained in the 20-point plan, without committing at the current stage to the goal of establishing a Palestinian state, and instead promoting a "vision of separation" that allows for the establishment of an independent but limited Palestinian sovereignty that is separate from Israel.

The document concludes with an explicit admission that Israel "has effectively abandoned a large part of its independence in its foreign and security policy in Gaza, in favor of a policy that is mostly formulated in Washington," while American "constructive ambiguity" gives Israel a margin to implement the plan through territorial control, redeployment, and verifying the disarmament of Hamas.

The document reveals in its essence a shift in the Israeli view of the future of Gaza, represented by the acknowledgment that Israel is no longer the main player in determining the future of the Strip, and that its role has become focused on influencing a policy that is formulated in Washington. In contrast, the "traffic light signals" attempt to turn the existing geographical division into a negotiating tool for gradual disarmament and reconstruction.

However, the success of this approach remains linked to American approval, Hamas's cooperation, and broad international participation, especially since the political path toward establishing a Palestinian state remains the biggest obstacle to real Arab and European involvement.

In its conclusion, the document warns that the success or failure of the 20-point and 15-point plans will depend to a large extent on Israel's ability to use its powers wisely, maintain cooperation with Washington, and continue the diplomatic path, warning that the failure of the two plans may be attributed to a large degree to Israel itself.