In a region where security and political transformations are accelerating, Jordan stands at a critical juncture that requires a reevaluation of its strategic position. The Iran-US war and its repercussions on neighboring countries, alongside the reshaping of regional alliances, place the Kingdom before questions that go beyond managing immediate crises to determining its position in a new security and political equation.
One of the most prominent transformations is the rise of regional defense arrangements, including the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani alliance, and what may result in redrawing the balance of power. Here the question arises: Where does Jordan stand? And what is the strategy that protects its national interests without restricting its options or pushing it into conflicts that do not serve its security?
Multi-dimensional challenges
Jordan faces three interconnected challenges.
Security and military: The geographical location of the Kingdom, its borders with conflict zones, and its security relations with the United States impose increasing challenges. Any regional escalation may reflect on Jordanian lands through missile and drone attacks, refugee movements, or the disruption of borders and trade routes. Therefore, protecting Jordanian sovereignty and territory must remain the top priority.
Economically and livelihood: Security cannot be separated from the economy. Regional tensions are putting pressure on tourism, trade, supply chains, energy, and transportation costs, while the Jordanian economy faces chronic challenges. Thus, reducing exposure to external shocks has become part of national security, not just a developmental goal.
Politically and in terms of alliances: The reshaping of alliances raises a question about the viability of the traditional policy based on maintaining a balanced distance from the axes. Jordan has strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United States, but it is not an official member of all emerging security arrangements. This grants it a margin of maneuver, but it requires developing new tools for influence and not just dealing with the repercussions of others' decisions.
Between joining axes and maintaining flexibility
Two main paths can be envisioned.
The first is joining a regional defense framework, which may provide greater strategic depth, enhance security and intelligence cooperation, and open the door to collective defense arrangements. However, official membership in a military alliance may limit diplomatic maneuverability, impose obligations that do not always align with national calculations, and potentially affect Jordan's relations with its Western allies.
The second path is to remain outside military axes while maximizing Jordan's role. In this case, Jordan can invest its position to become a 'hub state' in the region, difficult to bypass due to its role in trade, energy, transportation, security, and political dialogue. This requires developing Aqaba as a logistics center, enhancing trade links with Iraq, the Gulf, and Turkey, developing energy and transportation projects, and establishing Amman as a center for dialogue and mediation.
However, flexibility may turn into a source of weakness if it is not translated into practical influence, interests, and partnerships.
'Smart Middle' as a Jordanian choice
Jordan may not need to make a sharp choice between joining a military axis or standing outside it entirely, but rather a strategy based on the'smart middle'; that is, maintaining political flexibility while maximizing practical cooperation with various parties.
This approach is based on caution in commitments, studying any defense arrangements according to direct Jordanian interests, and expanding cooperation in information exchange, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, border protection, and training, without necessarily joining every collective defense framework.
Jordanian geography should also be transformed from a challenge into a strategic asset by investing in infrastructure, energy, transportation, Aqaba, and logistics zones, thereby enhancing the Kingdom's position as a link between the Gulf, the Levant, Turkey, and Europe.
What should be done now?
Four practical priorities emerge: establishing a permanent strategic cell that brings together institutions concerned with security, defense, foreign affairs, and the economy to monitor transformations and build scenarios; launching a Jordanian initiative for regional dialogue aimed at reducing escalation and exploring collective security arrangements; accelerating the energy security strategy through expanding solar and wind energy and local energy sources; and enhancing Jordan's economic and logistical role, particularly through developing Aqaba, trade corridors, and attracting quality investments.
Conclusion
Jordan is at a stage that does not tolerate impulsive decisions or merely waiting policy. What is needed is a strategy that combines sovereignty protection, alliance flexibility, maximizing economic interests, and expanding diplomatic role.
Jordan's strength will not be measured only by the size of its military alliances, but by its ability to make its geographical location, balanced relations, economy, and political status elements of strength that are difficult to bypass.
Hence, the'smart middle' may be a practical framework for action: neither withdrawal from the region nor subjugation to an axis, but calculated engagement, multiple partnerships, independent national decision-making, and a resilient economy.
