The problem is that Israel is well aware of the international community's stance on settlements. It knows very well that most countries in the world consider the settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories illegal under international law, and it also knows that settlement expansion directly undermines the prospects for establishing a viable Palestinian State. Yet, construction and expansion have continued for decades because successive Israeli governments have not faced a real political and economic price commensurate with the gravity of what they are doing on the ground. Consequently, the question is not whether Israel knows the settlements are illegal, but whether it will pay a real price for continuing to build them.
This is where the limitation of the new measures lies. Banning the import of settlement products, despite its political and moral importance, will not be sufficient alone to change Israeli calculations. The volume of trade associated with settlements is relatively limited compared to the volume of trade between Israel and European countries, meaning that the direct economic impact of these measures may be limited. Israel may simply succeed in absorbing these losses or redirecting some of its exports to other markets, while continuing to build and expand settlements at an even greater pace.
Indeed, the real danger is that this step will turn into something resembling a political cover for the countries that took it: they say they did something, while facts on the ground continue to shift in favor of the settlement project. This is the scenario that must be avoided. Because settlement is not based solely on exporting agricultural or commercial products, but rather on an entire system of planning, financing, construction, roads, infrastructure, services, and investments—a system that makes settlements an increasingly permanent reality that Israel seeks to impose in the West Bank.
If Britain, France, and other European countries are truly serious about halting settlement expansion, they must move from targeting products to targeting the system that makes settlement possible and profitable. This means imposing sanctions on companies participating in building settlements or expanding their infrastructure, on financial institutions funding these projects, and on investment institutions benefiting from them, in addition to imposing restrictions on individuals and organizations directly leading or supporting settlement expansion.
There must also be a clear mechanism for escalation. If Israel continues to build settlements despite current measures, the next step must be stronger and faster, rather than countries starting all over again to issue statements, warnings, and calls for restraint. Sanctions that do not escalate when violations persist ultimately turn into the exact opposite message: Israel can withstand them and continue its policy at the same time.
The matter is not just about the number of houses built here or there. Settlement is part of a broader political and geographical project to redraw the reality of the West Bank, control land, fragment Palestinian communities, and create Israeli spheres of influence that prevent the establishment of a geographically contiguous and viable Palestinian State. The more settlements, roads, and associated infrastructure expand, the more difficult the process of dismantling this reality becomes, and the less viable the two-state solution—which European countries still say they support—becomes.
It is precisely here that Europe must realize that protecting the two-state solution cannot be separated from confronting settlements. European countries cannot declare their commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian State and then suffice with limited measures while Israel continues to change the map upon which this state is supposed to be established. A policy that does not deal with the root of the problem will remain incapable of addressing its consequences.
If these countries want their message to be convincing, they must also review the nature of their economic relations with Israel when violations of international law persist. This does not necessarily mean cutting ties or imposing comprehensive sanctions, but rather using available economic and political tools in a gradual and conditional manner. As settlement expands, the cost must rise. As Israel retreats from expansion and respects its obligations, measures can be eased. This is how an effective pressure policy works: clear incentives and consequences, not just symbolic stances.
Past decades have proved that condemnations alone have not stopped settlement, and diplomatic statements have not prevented the building of new settlements. What has stopped or slowed state policies elsewhere has not been moral rhetoric alone, but the existence of a real political and economic cost for continuing behavior contrary to international law.
Therefore, the British, French, Canadian, and European step is welcome, but it must be the beginning, not the end. What is required is not merely banning the entry of some settlement products into European markets, but building an integrated policy that makes settlement costly politically, economically, and legally, and prevents European companies and institutions from becoming partners, directly or indirectly, in entrenching this project.
The real test of these sanctions is not whether they will prevent the entry of some crates and products into European markets, but whether they will make the Israeli government recalculate before issuing a new decision to build a settlement or expand another. If the message does not reach this stage, the sanctions will remain merely another formal procedure in a long record of measures that caused political noise, but changed nothing fundamental on the ground.
