On the other side, the rising cost of navigation and energy disruptions increases pressure on Washington and the affected countries to move beyond crisis management. If strikes and the blockade fail to change the equation, targeting the regime itself may advance among the options of Washington and some of its partners, with the possibility of broader international participation with varying European roles.
The confrontation in Yemen may reflect Tehran's attempt to expand pressure toward Bab al-Mandab through its allies, to compensate for a potential decline in the effectiveness of the Hormuz card. However, every arena has its own calculations and forces, and the shift of the confrontation to threatening the survival of the Iranian regime may place the region before another level of complexity.
If military and economic weakening leads to a rift in the Iranian leadership and its security institutions, internal unrest may arise, developing into confrontations between competing power centers, where power struggles intersect with national and regional tensions. At that point, Tehran's ability to control the interior and manage its influence networks abroad may decline.
Iraq is at the forefront of the arenas to which the echo of these confrontations may extend; as the influence of factions linked to Tehran overlaps with state institutions, their resources, and political balances. The shaking of the Iranian center may push some of its allies toward more independence and a rush to protect their positions, placing Baghdad before a tougher test to control weapons and decision-making.
The escalation of these factions may be accompanied by the emergence of counter-armed organizations, or the regrouping of existing forces under new names and alliances. Thus, the regional confrontation intertwines with power and resource struggles, decision-making centers multiply, and the military, security, political, and economic costs expand.
If internal Iranian unrest coincides with the escalation of external arenas, one may fuel the other, and containing the confrontation through an understanding between capitals may become more difficult. At that point, repercussions on energy, trade, and supply chains may worsen, and the calculations of international intervention may become complicated.
In the face of this possibility, the Arab opportunity to restore balance gains greater urgency. The Gulf rapprochement with Jordan and Syria, Egyptian support for Saudi Arabia, and the Mecca arrangements with Turkey and Pakistan constitute premises for a broader regional capacity to protect common interests, such that the value of this coordination is embodied in protecting state institutions, enhancing their ability to control weapons, decision-making, and borders, fortifying countries neighboring areas that may ignite, and linking security to economic robustness. Every vacuum left by declining influence is liable to be filled by more volatile forces, unless accompanied by an ability to stabilize.
Perhaps the war, in its broadest and most dangerous sense, has not yet begun. But if internal Iranian unrest meets with the expansion of the confrontation in Yemen and the explosion of the Iraqi arena, the region may become a stone's throw from the point of no return; when the war exceeds the ability of its parties to contain it, and starting its new phases becomes easier than possessing the decision to end it.
