The Israeli ballot boxes did not close the door on the battle, but rather transferred it from the street to the negotiation rooms, and from the seats to a clash of wills. The issue has become who can turn votes into power, and who has the ability to prevent their opponent from ruling. While Benjamin Netanyahu's camp advances in the partial results, and Gadi Eisenkot emerges as one of his most prominent rivals, the Arab bloc imposes itself as an unavoidable figure in the calculations of forming the next government. The race remains open, while a parliamentary majority requires 61 seats out of 120.
The important point here is that the preliminary results reveal a fundamental paradox: the Likud party might lead, and Netanyahu's camp might advance numerically, but that does not automatically grant him the ability to form a stable government. The difference between winning the largest number of seats and possessing a governing majority is the difference between the legitimacy of electoral progress and the legitimacy of the ability to govern.
Herein lies the fragility of the Israeli scene and the political fanaticism within it despite talk of democracy, as no camp can deal with the ballot box results as an absolute mandate. The seats distributed among small parties, some of which are threatened by the electoral threshold, could turn calculations upside down. Every seat that drops out of the calculations of one camp could turn into an opportunity for the other, or an additional obstacle to the birth of the government.
Therefore, judging the identity of the final winner remains premature before sorting is completed and official results are announced. However, what is certain is that the elections have reopened the crisis of representation and governance, and have not yet provided a decisive solution to it.
As for the number of seats achieved by the Arab parties, their importance lies in their position within the balance of power. When competing Jewish blocs fail to secure an independent majority, the Arab vote becomes a decisive factor in determining the identity of the government, or perhaps in preventing its formation.
This power is not a blank check for any party, nor an automatic guarantee to oust Netanyahu. Rather, it is a power conditional on the ability of Arab parties to coordinate their positions, formulate clear demands, and negotiate on the basis of a measurable political program, rather than contenting themselves with the role of the casting vote at decisive moments.
The biggest problem strongly raised now is: will the Jewish opposition accept Arab partnership as a legitimate part of building the majority? Netanyahu responded to this with a complete rejection of such participation. So, are Arab votes now being utilized to oust Netanyahu while keeping their owners outside the circle of decision-making?
Here we stand on important ground, which is that turning numerical strength into actual gains also requires clarity in objectives, political guarantees, and cohesion among the Arab forces themselves.
The path ahead for Eisenkot is not easy, as his partners' positions vary regarding the participation of Arab parties, and some of their priorities conflict on issues of security, conscription, religious budgets, and the relationship with the Palestinians.
Three main tracks emerge here, including a minority government backed by an Arab parliamentary safety net, a national unity government that rearranges the balance of power and reduces its reliance on the far-right, or deadlocked negotiations leading to new elections while a transitional government remains in power.
No track is devoid of political costs. A minority government may face difficulty in passing legislation, a unity government may impose compromises on its parties and provoke accusations of backtracking on electoral pledges, while early elections may reproduce the crisis instead of solving it.
The Israeli scene cannot be separated from American and regional calculations. Washington is concerned with a government capable of managing security files, maintaining strategic coordination, and advancing normalization tracks and regional arrangements. This consideration may encourage the search for a broader coalition formula, but American pressure should not be treated as a guarantee for the success of a unity government or a specific political agreement.
As for the prospect of escalation with Iran and its allies, it represents a pressing factor for all scenarios, not conclusive proof that war is imminent. Security risks may be used to justify internal consensus, or conversely, they may increase the intensity of disagreement over the timing, limits, and costs of confrontation.
The strategic importance here is who will determine the decision of war and peace, and whether security calculations will be subject to state institutions or turned into a tool in internal political conflict.
It is good to comprehend a fundamental point: changing the leadership does not mean a shift in Israeli policies. Eisenkot’s government may differ from Netanyahu’s government in managing relations with Washington, dealing with the judiciary, and curbing some far-right practices, but it may maintain many security, settlement, and expansionist constants, while disagreement over the future of the Palestinian state persists.
Annexation procedures will not stop, restrictions imposed on Palestinians will not recede, the course of war will not change, and the Arab partnership will not transform from an arithmetic necessity into a political recognition of the rights and status of Arab citizens.
The Israeli elections revealed that controlling parliament does not necessarily mean controlling the government, and that the Arab bloc is present in the calculations of power. However, the real value lies in the ability of its owners to translate electoral weight into tangible political influence.
As for Netanyahu, he will remain capable of maneuvering as long as negotiations are open, but his ability to govern will remain tied to the extent of his success in assembling a viable majority. Between a minority government, a unity coalition, and new elections, the most decisive factor remains whether the competing forces will succeed in building a political settlement, or leave the doors of crisis and escalation open.
