Washington redraws its priorities... Has it begun abandoning its allies?

There are reasons that go beyond military calculations. First, the Donald Trump administration views alliances through the logic of deals and direct interest, not as an absolute moral or strategic commitment. Second, Washington's desire to avoid an open war in Yemen, with all the human and financial burdens and potential for regional expansion it entails. Third, the United States wants to maintain a negotiating margin with the parties to the conflict, even when this conflicts with the expectations and calculations of a strategic partner that is the largest and oldest in the Arab world and the Middle East (an alliance that began at the end of World War II in 1945 between US President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Al Saud).

But can the Israeli factor be ruled out? It is legitimate to wonder whether the stalling of Saudi normalization with Israel, and Riyadh's insistence on linking it to the recognition of a Palestinian state, have contributed to the decline in American enthusiasm for providing more solid security guarantees to the Kingdom. There is not enough evidence to conclude that Washington is militarily punishing Saudi Arabia for this reason, but the divergence of priorities between the two parties remains a political factor that cannot be ignored, especially when security files become part of broader regional negotiations. As for alternative alliances, most notably the Makkah Defense Agreement that brought together Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, they reflect a growing realization in Riyadh that relying on a single umbrella is no longer a guaranteed option. However, signing agreements is one thing, and turning them into a joint deterrence system with clear leadership, operational capabilities, and intelligence coordination is another. The standard is not the number of signatory countries, but their ability to act when one of them is in danger. The most dangerous aspect here is that the gap between security promises and the reality on the ground may widen, leading countries in the region to recalculate their positions and begin seeking to diversify their military and technological partnerships, and perhaps even arrangements independent of Washington. Here, we must not rush to conclude that this necessarily means the collapse of the US-Saudi and Gulf alliance, but it does mean a decline in confidence in it as an automatic guarantee of security.

The question that should occupy Arab capitals today is not whether the United States will remain an ally, but what kind of alliance it is, and how robust it remains when its interests conflict with those of Washington.

A state that buys American weapons, hosts American forces, and coordinates security with Washington cannot assume that all these elements will automatically translate into military intervention when necessary.

In a world governed only by interests, it is not enough to be an ally of Washington; you must also possess the alternatives that prevent it from treating your security as a bargaining chip.