At first, the language was purely military; wide strikes targeted Iranian military, nuclear, and missile installations, in parallel with American and Israeli discourse talking about weakening Iran's capabilities and imposing new conditions on it. But the war soon revealed that destroying installations does not necessarily mean destroying Iran's ability to continue. Over time, the battle shifted from trying to impose a quick American will to an open war of attrition, in which Tehran does not seem ready to surrender, which was part of the political ceiling raised by Trump.
And here the oscillation began. In June, Washington accepted temporary understandings that ended the first phase of the war and opened the door to negotiations on the nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. Trump presented the agreement at the time as a major success, but the core details remained pending, especially those related to the nuclear file, missiles, and monitoring mechanisms, and then the language of war returned to the fore.
In July, some military operations were suspended amid warnings that the campaign had reached the limits of its effectiveness, and that ammunition stocks were beginning to pose a problem for the ability to continue operations at the same level. In September, Trump rejected an Iranian proposal that included a ceasefire and a gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and then said he expected negotiations to resume.
In the latest developments, Trump said on October 1 that the recent Iranian agreement was not enough, and that he might resume the bombing after the November 3 elections. Here lies Trump's real dilemma; the war has not yet produced the result that allows him to declare a victorious end, and diplomacy has not produced the agreement that he can present as Iranian surrender.
The most dangerous thing for the White House is that the war is no longer an external issue separate from the lives of Americans; fuel prices have risen, confidence in the economy has declined, and the cost of war has become part of the internal debate. On October 1, Trump effectively entered the mobilization phase for the midterm elections, while his party faces increasing political pressure.
From here, Trump seems to have almost three paths with no fourth: a large-scale military escalation after the elections, which carries the risk of a longer and more costly war; a return to a negotiated deal that he can market as an American achievement; or keeping the war in a state of 'neither war nor peace,' with economic and military pressure and negotiation attempts at the same time.
But the problem is that each of the above options carries a price. Escalation may give Trump a chance to regain the initiative, but it may ignite a war that is difficult to determine its ceiling. Negotiation may stop the bleeding, but it requires concessions that Iran does not seem ready to make under current American conditions. As for maintaining the status quo, it leaves the American president facing a long war with no clear picture of the end.
Thus, Iran is gradually turning from a test of American military strength into a test of Trump's own political vision, who entered the White House wanting to prove that American strength can impose the end that Washington wants. But today he finds himself facing a more complex equation: Iran has not surrendered, diplomacy has not succeeded, the war has not ended, and the midterm elections are approaching.
And the question that will haunt Trump in the coming weeks is not: Can America strike Iran? That is something that does not need proof.
The harder question: Can America end this war on terms that Washington can call a victory?
