Poverty and unemployment are fundamentally local problems. They are geographically unevenly distributed and are not solved by additional employment in a saturated public sector or by a large project that opens once every few years, but by small and medium-sized projects that are born and managed where people live.
The parallel problem is that every small decision ascends to Amman. A modest project in a peripheral province waits its turn behind major national files on the same table. The result is congestion in the 'mind of the state' and slow implementation, not because the intention is absent, but because a single center cannot accommodate all the details. Alleviating this congestion is not a concession of authority, but a restoration of the center's ability to focus on what is strategic.
We are not facing an untested idea. We have experienced decentralization with elected councils, but we transferred representation without transferring the budget, so a large part of the decision remained at the center, and the results were less than expected. Today's timing is favorable for correcting the course: the new Local Administration Law redefines governorate councils as platforms for development and investment planning and introduces the concept of participatory budgeting. This aligns with the vision of economic modernization and the outputs of political modernization in linking representation with responsibility. What is needed is not a new idea, but an implementation mechanism for an idea approved by the state. I propose a draft plan with six axes:
Axis One: A distribution equation is studied and adopted before allocation. Not a single dinar is distributed before the approval of a public equation that combines population, area, service delivery cost, degree of deprivation, and absorptive capacity for implementation. The announced equation closes the door to allocation by relationships and shifts the debate from 'why did others get it?' to 'is the criterion correct?' - a healthy debate that is resolved by data, not influence.
Axis Two: The government's share first, then the distribution. The government's allocations are first deducted to cover its sovereign duties and responsibilities, and what remains is the amount subject to the equation. In this order, decentralization does not become a burden on the state's obligations, nor do the governorates become hostages to a deficit they did not create.
Axis Three: The citizen elects who plans and decides. The elected council approves the priorities and projects of its governorate within the ceiling of its allocations, the executive body implements what has been approved and not decided, and the government in the capital directs, monitors, corrects, and holds accountable - not plans on behalf. This separation between who decides, who implements, and who monitors is the essence of the equation; without it, the councils remain a consultative facade without authority.
Axis Four: Coordination, not conflict, between the governor, the council, and the municipality. Each of these parties has a role that cannot be replaced by another: the elected council approves the governorate's priorities, the municipality implements what falls within the scope of its services and boundaries, and the governor represents the state's authority in supervision and correction, coordinating with the central government in Amman when necessary. This is organized by a written matrix of powers that specifies in each project who approves, who implements, and who monitors, and by a periodic coordination meeting that addresses overlap before it turns into obstruction. When roles are written, accountability in the event of any failure becomes possible and fair: everyone is questioned according to their authority and the role assigned to them, not according to their position.
Axis Five: Local funding that creates projects, not jobs. A portion of each governorate's allocation is allocated to stimulate small and medium-sized projects, with the state's money serving as a guarantor or incentive for private funding, not a substitute for it, accompanied by a single licensing window within the governorate and an incubator that supports management, marketing, and accountability. A small project rarely dies due to lack of money alone; it dies due to the absence of someone to manage it after its first few months.
Axis Six: Gradation linked to performance and accountability in both directions. The transfer starts with a limited portion of capital spending that expands according to the performance of each governorate, not according to a rigid timetable; those who achieve deserve a larger share, and those who lag behind receive technical support before receiving additional money. This is accompanied by published performance indicators, auditing by the Audit Bureau, and a clear right for the government to intervene correctively with pre-announced criteria, not an arbitrary decision.
What is strategic - water, energy, transportation, and major infrastructure - remains the responsibility of the government and from its allocations. Decentralization is the distribution of decision-making, not the fragmentation of the state, and confusing the two levels is the fastest way to its failure.
It may be said that all this requires studies. This is true, but it is a one-year study that saves the country years of trial and error. The longer-term impact is as much political as it is economic: when the citizen knows that the council he elects has a real budget and decides on projects he sees in front of his house, his electoral behavior changes, and with it, the quality of those who run and those who are elected. Participation is not begged for with campaigns, but bought with competence.
The criterion for success in the end is simple: how many projects were born in the governorate this year, not how many meetings were held in the capital.
