Here, politics meets the economy directly. Economic modernization is not measured only by the number of plans and projects announced, but by what they leave on the ground: an investment that actually starts, a factory that expands, a new job opportunity, a Jordanian company finding a market, a project in a governorate that stimulates activity around it, and a road, water, or energy that removes an obstacle that was preventing investment. This is the distance that politics should help to shorten: the distance between the idea and the result.
Jordan does not need politics to restate its economic problems; it knows them. Unemployment is known, the challenges of investment, production, transportation, and energy are known, and the disparities between governorates are known. What is needed is the next step: where is an opportunity that has not been exploited? Why was an investment that could have succeeded stalled? What legislation raises the cost of labor? And what decision can be changed so that a sector that we discuss every year as a problem turns into a source of income and job opportunities?
Here, specifically, the party takes on a real economic meaning. A serious party does not wait for the release of growth and unemployment figures to comment on them, but builds knowledge that allows it to delve into the details of the economy itself. So if it talks about employment, it should say where jobs can be created and how. If it demands to attract investment, it should specify what is holding back the investor. If it talks about the governorates, it should know what each governorate can produce or attract, and what it lacks to do so.
Then the political program becomes measurable. We do not just ask if the idea is beautiful, but what it will do for growth, work, income, and investment, and how long it will take to show its result.
Parliament is a key part of this equation, because many economic decisions go through legislation, budgeting, and oversight. The question about an economic law should not stop at the soundness of its text; it should extend to its impact. Does it facilitate business creation or complicate it? Does it lower the cost of investment or add a new cost? Does it help the small project to grow? And does public spending lead to new economic activity or does its impact end with the end of spending?
As for local administration, I believe there is one of the largest areas where political modernization can meet economic modernization in a way that the citizen can see directly. The economy does not happen only in Amman, nor only in national figures. It happens when an investment comes to Karak, or an industrial activity expands in Mafraq, or a tourism opportunity arises in Tafila, or a project in Irbid benefits from the knowledge and skills around it, or a prominent site in a governorate turns into an activity that provides income for its people.
This is why knowledge of the governorate itself is an economic issue, not just an administrative one. Centralization is not always centralization of decision-making; sometimes it is centralization of knowledge itself. The governorate knows the available land, the existing skills, the stalled project, the road that the investor needs, the sector that can grow, and the small obstacle that may actually be the reason for the delay of a large investment.
When this knowledge reaches the national decision, development becomes more precise. Instead of talking about the development of governorates as a general concept, each governorate has a clear economic question: what can this governorate add to the Jordanian economy, and what does it need to do so?
This question alone can change a lot. Because it shifts the relationship between the center and the governorate from demanding a share of spending to seeking the ability to produce. The goal is not for public money to reach the governorate and then its impact ends, but to help it create an activity that remains after it: a project that attracts another project, an industry that builds services around it, a tourist site that creates small businesses, or infrastructure that opens a new area to investment.
From here, parties, parliament, and local administration can be seen as tributaries of economic modernization as well. The party can propose, parliament can reveal an impact that was not calculated, the local level can identify an opportunity or obstacle that does not appear from Amman, and the government has the executive ability and the national image that brings it all together. The result that matters to the citizen in the end is very simple: was a job opportunity created? Did investment move? Did activity in his governorate increase? And did the service or infrastructure become better?
Here, in my opinion, the strength of the royal vision that placed political, economic, and administrative modernization within a broader national concept appears. These paths become more valuable when they serve each other: politics expands the circle of ideas, the economy turns good ideas into opportunities, projects, and income, and administration makes implementation possible.
And for this reason, I do not see the success of political modernization separate from the economy. After years, the important question will not just be how many parties we have or how many people entered political life. The question will be more realistic: did a political idea contribute to creating an economic opportunity? Did a governorate discover a project that was absent from attention? Did a legislation open a door to investment? Did an economic decision improve because the parliament, a party, or a local council saw something that was not apparent?
Here, the results of modernization become visible and measurable: a job that did not exist, an investment that would not have come, a project that went from paper to land, and a governorate that became producing a larger part of its income and opportunities. Then, political, economic, and administrative modernization are no longer three adjacent headlines; each one of them becomes a reason for the success of the other.
