The extremism here is not only evident in political discourse, but also in the way sources of danger are defined and the Palestinian reality is reshaped according to extreme security hypotheses. Instead of addressing the roots of tension in the West Bank and recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the establishment of their independent state on their national soil, extremist Israeli political forces are proposing to undermine the Palestinian Authority, weaken its institutions, collect weapons, and expand military operations as tools to deal with the risks. With the continuation of this approach, the authority itself, which is presented as a potential precursor to the establishment of a state by a qualified party that can be dealt with, turns into a political and security target.
This vision explains the escalation of talk about 'turning the cannons' as a scenario that deserves military preparation, as Israeli reports have spoken about operational plans to deal with the possibility of a collapse in the security arrangements in the West Bank, which reflects the widening circle of fears within the military institution. However, the existence of a plan to deal with a security possibility does not mean that there is information confirming that the Palestinian security services are preparing to implement this imaginary scenario. Distinguishing between the two is necessary so that the security hypothesis does not turn into a political reality used to justify further escalation and repression against the Palestinian people and their institutions.
The paradox is that the extremism that produces these hypotheses may contribute to creating the environment that its proponents fear. When policies are directed towards weakening the authority, pressuring its institutions, restricting movement, and expanding military operations, in conjunction with escalating settler attacks, the result will certainly be an increase in tension and a weakening of the ability of Palestinian institutions to control the street. As this ability declines, the security vacuum widens and the chances of confrontation increase, making the scenarios that are being warned against more likely to emerge.
The danger lies in the fact that the West Bank is a highly complex environment, in which cities, villages, settlements, roads, checkpoints, and military zones are intertwined. The Palestinian security services have trained elements, field experience, and weapons linked to their security tasks. Any widespread collapse in the existing relationship may shift the scene from a limited friction to a confrontation of a different nature, especially if it coincides with the continuation of military attacks and settler crimes or bloody events against Palestinians that may cause the street to ignite.
In conclusion, 'turning the cannons' reflects an environment in which Israeli extremism is increasingly present and influential, and the space for rational and realistic political dealing with the Palestinian issue is narrowing. The more policies are directed towards undermining the authority and weakening its institutions, the higher the likelihood of the chaos that Israel claims to fear. Herein lies the most dangerous paradox, as the extremism that produces the fear of an explosion may become one of the factors that push towards it, leaving the West Bank facing a cycle of escalation that begins with an extremist and unrealistic idea and ends with a crisis that is difficult to contain.
