Syria remained under the weight of exaggerated security measures among numerous agencies monitoring everything, to the point where individuals became suspicious of their own relatives and even the walls and their ears. Yet, it became clear that the borders were not under full control and that the opposition managed to exploit many loopholes. Regardless of talk about external support, this does not absolve the security apparatus of its miscalculations before and during the crisis, turning Syria into a hotbed where not only its own problems interact, but also the surplus crises from distant parts of the world are imported.
The same applies to Yemen, where the Houthi crisis escalated while Sana'a ignored their reality in the high mountainous regions, which were absent from the map of concern. After the opportunity for participation regarding their demands and grievances was aborted, they shifted to vying for power, relying on strength that had accumulated amidst many gaps in the security vision of the authorities in Sana'a.
Libya and Sudan were not far from that reality and the same problem, which confines security to a procedural vision that gets rid of problems by silencing, disappearing, or excluding those who raise them. Over time, security becomes an isolating wall between the state and its citizens.
This does not mean an acquittal for some politically active parties in those countries, as they presented themselves as an entry point for infiltrating the state structure and its project. However, what was happening was security lethargy that did not work on understanding, sorting, and containment to establish constructive communication. Often, the crisis of security agencies was their affiliation with regional, ethnic, or partisan backgrounds, which made them—instead of being security for the state as a whole—part of the political game in many cases. With this composition, they could not gain the trust of the opposition, which over time began to lean toward the same divisive sanctuaries in society.
The approach to security in the Arab region needs a broad review and a serious dialogue where security personnel do not compete to demonstrate control, but rather base their work on attempting to understand and exchanging expertise in containment and reviewing many old mistakes. This is because security is not achieved merely by silencing sources of anxiety, but by understanding them and distinguishing between what targets the state and what expresses the crises of society; for controlling citizens does not always and guaranteedly mean the ability to protect the state.
