In Washington, the test appears difficult for Republicans; as the race enters its final stages, prediction markets place the probability at up to 93% for Democrats to regain control of at least one house, and the shift in the general mood is clear, with Democrats leading according to opinion polls.
Inside Congress itself, war funding has become the biggest source of division. Last July, the House of Representatives approved a $95 billion spending cap framework paving the way for a bill that includes funding for the war on Iran, at a time when calls are mounting in the Senate to cut funding, alongside talks about the Pentagon's readiness to deploy a third carrier strike group and the President considering the resumption of strikes after the midterm elections in early November, while support for operations in Yemen also remains suspended.
In Israel, these are the first general elections following a Knesset that has completed its full four-year term since 1988, the first elections since the Gaza war, and the first elections to be held on their statutory date since 1988. There is a marked shift toward the far-right, a trend carrying the agenda of resettling Gaza, facilitating the removal of its population, and annexing the West Bank, while settler violence has reached unprecedented levels.
This violence is not marginal, but rather documented as systematic violence including military assaults on the besieged Gaza Strip, bloody massacres in the West Bank, ongoing settler attacks, and land confiscations.
All of this converges on the most dangerous link: the war on Iran, which has entered its eighth month after turning the global oil market upside down by disrupting the flow of oil through two vital waterways.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil used to pass, has remained effectively closed to commercial traffic, while the Bab el-Mandeb strait is witnessing a war, with Tehran's use of the Houthis as a tool of pressure becoming clearly evident.
In this sense, the elections in Washington and Israel are no longer internal affairs; the former will decide whether Congress will continue to issue blank checks for open-ended wars or begin to shut them down, while the latter will decide whether the far-right will continue to exploit the aftermath of October 7 to impose facts on the ground regarding annexation and displacement, or if internal division will force a different path.
Between October 27 and November 3, the region is not just awaiting results, but is bracing for new repercussions concerning war and energy—repercussions that could be more dangerous than the phase preceding these elections.
The reality is that the region and the world are in a state of waiting and stagnation, and the deeper the military situation becomes, the further political solutions appear.
Therefore, the post-November 3 period may not bring automatic de-escalation; a divided Congress may restrict the White House but will not stop wars by decree, and a far-right Knesset may grant Netanyahu, or his successor, a mandate to deepen settlement activity rather than curb it.
The greatest danger is that both sides emerge from the elections feeling they have won a mandate for escalation rather than settlement, leaving the region facing wider maps of war.
