Weekly Analytical Summary of Oil and Gas Markets until Friday, September 18, 2026

On Friday, September 18:

Brent: about $104.1 per barrel, down about $0.8 in the session, and on a limited weekly decline of about 0.5%.

West Texas: about $101.2, down about $0.7 in the session.

Prices remained much higher than pre-crisis levels, with Brent rising by about 15% during the current month according to market estimates.

Oil derivatives

The most stringent picture appears in the products market, particularly:

Diesel: reached record levels exceeding $6 per gallon in the United States.

Diesel exports from Russia and the Middle East declined by about two-thirds compared to 2025 according to market estimates, due to refinery damage and attacks on refining facilities.

Therefore, the price of diesel may remain high even if Brent crude declines, because the main problem is the lack of refining capacity and inventories, not just a shortage of crude.

Conclusion: The rise in derivative prices does not always move at the same rate as crude; the final price is affected by crude, refining margins, product availability, shipping and insurance costs, and inventories.

Second: Supply and demand trends

Global supply

The International Energy Agency estimates that global oil production in 2026 may decline by about 5.7 million barrels per day, or about 6%, due to Middle East disruptions and attacks on oil infrastructure. Saudi production in August fell to about 6 million barrels per day according to the agency's estimates, the lowest level in over three decades.

The agency also reduced its 2026 production forecast for Russia to about 8.7 million barrels per day, after its production in August fell to 8.36 million barrels per day due to refinery damage and oil facility damage.

Global demand

The current paradox is that the rise in prices has not led to a greater increase in price due to the clear destruction of demand:

The International Energy Agency expects global demand in 2026 to decline by about 2.5 million barrels per day.

JPMorgan estimates that demand has declined by about 4.4 million barrels per day year-on-year amid the war and rising prices.

In contrast, OPEC remains more optimistic about demand, reflecting a fundamental difference between the organization's estimates and those of the International Energy Agency.

This means that rising prices have begun to put pressure on transportation, industry, and consumption, especially in Asia and price-sensitive markets.

Third: OPEC+

On September 6, the seven countries concerned with voluntary adjustments within OPEC+ decided to maintain September production for implementation in October, while emphasizing full adherence to quotas and continuing monthly meetings. The next meeting is scheduled for October 4, 2026.

Significance of the decision

The OPEC+ decision reflects three objectives:

Not to inject large additional quantities that may put pressure on prices at a time when demand is declining.

Maintaining a reserve capacity to address any worsening of Gulf disruptions.

Avoiding the destruction of global demand by allowing more severe price increases.

Therefore, OPEC+ does not currently appear ready to use its full spare capacity to flood the market, keeping the risk margin high.

Fourth: Geopolitical developments and maritime routes

Strait of Hormuz

Ship traffic through Hormuz remains much lower than usual:

On Thursday, only 4 essential goods ships crossed the strait.

The average over the previous ten days was about 16 ships per day.

Before the crisis, the strait handled about 20% of global oil and gas shipments.

This decline does not necessarily mean a complete legal closure, but it practically means that a large part of the market is treating the strait as a high-risk passage, raising:

- Shipping wages.

- Insurance premiums.

- Journey times.

- Price risk premiums.

- The cost of delivering oil and gas to the end consumer.

Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea

Traffic through Bab al-Mandab remains slightly below average, with ongoing risks associated with attacks on ships and military responses in the region. This increases the importance of rerouting shipments through longer routes, doubling the cost of supply to Europe and Asia.

Saudi Arabia and export routes

Some concerns improved after Saudi Arabia began working to restore about half of the capacity of the East-West pipeline, with more shipments being diverted to Asia via Oman. However, the market did not consider this a final solution, as continued tensions and attacks could quickly disrupt supplies again.

Strike on a tanker in Hormuz

Concern increased after a Togo-flagged tanker was struck by an Iranian attack in the Strait of Hormuz, confirming that navigation risks are not theoretical, and that any new incident could quickly raise prices even without significant production losses.

Fifth: Liquefied Natural Gas

The liquefied natural gas market is currently tighter than the oil market.

Asian gas shipment prices have risen to about $26 per thousand British thermal units.

The price has risen by about 150% since February.

Asia's imports in September are expected to reach about 20.09 million tons, the lowest September level in eight years.

China's estimated imports have fallen to about 4.32 million tons, while Pakistan's imports have declined by about 75%.

In contrast, Europe is expected to increase its imports in preparation for winter, with increasing reliance on US gas.

Estimates suggest that Qatar's LNG exports may remain affected until early 2027, with about 12.8 million tons annually of export capacity disrupted, prompting Qatar to seek long-term contracts from the United States to compensate for part of the shortfall.

European risk

Although the European market remains less tense than the 2022 crisis, gas prices have risen from about 30 to 80 euros per megawatt-hour, while inventories are only about 70%, one of the lowest levels recorded. If winter comes with cold weather and demand rises by about 30 billion cubic meters, prices could jump to about 200 euros per megawatt-hour.

Sixth: Expectations for next week

Likely scenario

The basic scenario is continued fluctuation within high levels:

Brent: approximately between $101 and $109 per barrel.

West Texas: between $98 and $106.

Diesel: will remain tighter than gasoline.

LNG: remains sensitive to any news related to Qatar, Hormuz, or European winter preparations.

Factors that may drive prices higher

1- Further decline in navigation through Hormuz.

2- Injury to new tankers or energy facilities.

3- Longer disruption of the Saudi East-West pipeline.

4- Failure of any US-Iran negotiation path.

5- Increased European gas demand with slower restocking.

Factors that may drive prices lower

1- Regular return of shipping through Hormuz.

2- Saudi Arabia restoring full alternative transport capabilities.

3- An implementable truce agreement in the region.

4- Accelerated decline in demand in China and Asia.

5- Improvement in commercial inventory indicators or release of additional emergency quantities.

Seventh: Potential impacts on Jordan

Prices of gasoline, diesel, and gas

The Pricing Committee for Oil Derivatives kept September prices at:

1- 90-octane gasoline: 1.000 JD/liter

2- 95-octane gasoline: 1.310 JD/liter

3- Diesel: 0.850 JD/liter

4- Kerosene: 0.550 JD/liter

5- Household gas cylinder 12.5 kg: 7 JD

6- LNG support for the industrial sector: about 1.6 million JD during September.

The Jordanian pricing mechanism is based on the average global prices during the period prior to pricing, so daily price movements do not directly translate to the pump. However, the continuation of Brent above $100, and the high levels of diesel and LNG, increase the likelihood of continued pressure on next month's pricing if the differences are not absorbed or global averages decline.

Energy bill

1- The continuation of these levels means for Jordan:

2- Higher cost of importing oil and products.

3- Increased shipping and insurance costs due to disrupted routes.

4- Pressure on the cost of electricity, transportation, industry, and agriculture.

5- Wider gaps between actual cost and local prices.

6- Potential increase in the burden on the treasury if the policy of fixing or gradual passing of increases continues.

Local data indicated that the treasury has borne cumulative differences of about 224 million JD by the end of August due to absorbing part of the global increases.

Supply security

Jordan is currently not facing an actual indicator of fuel disruption, but the main risk is the rising cost of insurance, transportation, and access, not just the shortage of quantities. The importance of Aqaba, strategic reserves, and diversification of suppliers and routes remains very high amid the reduced movement of ships through Hormuz and the turbulence in the Red Sea.

The Jordanian economy

The most likely impacts will be in:

1. Transportation and logistics wages.

2. Industrial production cost.

3. Food prices due to the rise in diesel and transportation.

4. The cost of agriculture, irrigation, and heating.

5. Household purchasing power.

6. Trade deficit.

Inflationary pressures, especially if the crisis lasts.

However, stabilizing prices reduces the short-term shock on citizens and productive sectors, at the expense of transferring part of the cost to the public finance. Therefore, the continuation of high prices for weeks or months is much more dangerous than a temporary rise for a few days.

Final assessment for Jordan

So far, the situation indicates that the biggest problem for Jordan is not the interruption of supplies, but the rising cost of securing and financing them. If Brent remains above $100, and the shortage of diesel and liquefied natural gas continues, the pressure on the energy bill, treasury, and productive sectors will increase. As for the stability of gasoline and diesel prices locally, it will depend on three main factors:

1. The average global derivatives prices during the pricing period.

2. The cost of shipping, insurance, and alternative routes.

3. The amount of differences that the government will continue to absorb or pass on to the market.

Practical conclusion for next week:

A limited decline in oil is possible, but returning to pre-crisis levels is unlikely unless there is a clear security improvement in Hormuz and the Red Sea, while diesel and gas remain the biggest concern for the Jordanian economy