Has the region succeeded for over a century—far beyond breaking free on its own from its bilateral or regional dilemmas—in doing so? The answer seems easy and clear: no. However, reading this context cannot be isolated from the global context. We find that its problems and complexities resulted from the first bipolarity (France and Britain) and the subsequent bipolarity (Russia and America). Even in the Far East, examples include the Taiwan knot and the Korean knot, and in Latin America, there are many examples, nor can Africa be isolated from this context. Thus, the issue is not exclusive to the Middle East, even though it is more pronounced, fiercer, and more confrontational here, as well as the most affected by major conflicts and the most influential politically, economically, and militarily in the world. This makes the Middle Eastern issue volatile and extremely complex, carrying chronic knots that are difficult to dissolve through local compromises alone.
However, the more pressing question is: Does the region possess the collective will and general consensus that qualifies it to build self-made exits from the dilemmas and conflicts sweeping the region? It is vividly clear that the region lacks the minimum level of general consensus that contributes to creating atmospheres of de-escalation and building spaces of trust shared by all. Alongside the emergence of international interventions in the layers of these shocks and chronic conflicts, an even more prominent truth is that states and entities within the region are building plans and practicing policies aimed at imposing their hegemony and creating influence over neighboring countries, turning this near and relatively distant neighborhood into a subordinate political and vital sphere. Moreover, this neighborhood becomes a protective and defensive cordon by fighting their wars and clashes far from their borders, with these wars fought by others' hands and on distant land.