What the Arabs want from Iran, simply and briefly, is for it to be a normal state and a safe neighbor that abandons the concept of exporting the revolution and meddling in Arab internal arenas, dissolves its armed arms and militias, and encourages their transformation into ordinary political parties under the roof of the national state, its constitution, and its laws.
With Iran's response to these demands, a new regional situation will emerge. States will move toward approaches of regional cooperation, setting aside division and sectarian hostility, and perhaps paving the way for a grand Middle Eastern regional economic, political, and security system that isolates Israel and corners it. All the spotlight will return to the occupation, the cause of the Palestinian people, and the fascist criminal practices against them, exposing Israel as the only and last occupying state in the world.
Thus, the war on Iran will lose any chance of continuation or renewal, and the Strait of Hormuz will return to operation as it was before the war. The nuclear issue will return to being a bilateral matter for negotiations only, perhaps preferably within a collective international framework. Indeed, it will be an opportunity to re-introduce the principle of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, including Israel.
It is in Iran's interest to make concessions to the Arabs instead of ultimately kneeling before the United States. Let us be frank: the balance of power does not allow for the defeat of the United States, which is capable of combining military and economic weapons according to circumstances and reducing—as it is doing now—its reliance on military actions in favor of harsher economic measures every day. This may extend for the necessary amount of time, and if complete collapse does not occur, severe harm will remain continuous and permanent for Iran and all countries in the region except Israel.
There is a strategic turnaround that Tehran can undertake to win the war, running counter to the path of the Revolutionary Guard, which has reached a dead end and should have been discarded since the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria. It is not too much to ask that Tehran shift its approach and Arab relations toward respecting the independence, security, and sovereignty of states, both large and small. This has a specific and practical entitlement: in Yemen, ending the Houthi coup and rebuilding a national army under a national unity government comprising all components; in Iraq, dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces and all armed militias, and halting interference, security control, corruption, and the looting of the country's resources; and in Lebanon, supporting the unity of arms in the hands of the state and the transformation of Hezbollah into an ordinary political party.
These are not imaginary demands. They lie at the core of the interest of the state and people in Iran, instead of spending billions abroad for the glory of the Revolutionary Guard and its expansionist, doctrinal, and sectarian projects. That is unacceptable in today's world. Nor is it acceptable to sabotage countries, create strife, and bet on sectarian components that lead to a catastrophic internal conflict or destructive civil wars as seen in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.
What the Arabs want from Iran is clear and logical, and the sane voices in Iran know it is the solution. However, the Revolutionary Guard responds by shelling targets in Arab and Gulf states instead of bombing American floating bases within arm's reach, directs twenty missiles directly at Jordan instead of Israel, uses the Houthis to shell Saudi Arabia to bypass the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, and directs Hezbollah to be intransigent and reject the unity of arms in the hands of the state even if a civil war breaks out.
There is no value in the confrontation with America in bombing military and economic sites in the Arab neighborhood; rather, this is the policy of the Revolutionary Guard, which in reality shells every voice inside Iran that seeks the correct solution of reconciliation with the Arab neighborhood.
